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Abstract 
Do matching frictions affect youth employment in developing countries? We organise job fairs in Addis 
Ababa, to match firms with a representative sample of young, educated job-seekers. We create very few 
jobs: one for approximately 10 firms that attended. We explore reasons for this, and find significant 
evidence for mismatched expectations: about wages, about firms requirements and about the average 
quality of job-seekers. We find evidence of learning and updating of beliefs in the aftermath of the fair. 
This changes behaviour: both workers and firms invest more in formal job search after the fairs. 
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1 A matching experiment
High youth unemployment is a major challenge for countries all over the world. Active
labour market policies have attempted to help young people to move into work, but with
limited success. Training programmes, in particular, have been found to have low returns
in developing countries (McKenzie, 2017). Job search assistance programs have shown more
promising results in terms of the cost effectiveness of getting young people into work (Franklin,
2015; Abebe et al., 2016). Yet getting workers into their first job might not be the ultimate
solution to frictions in the labour market. Informational problems may prevent young people
from finding out what work suits them, including having unrealistic expectations about what
kind of work they could reasonably find (Groh et al., 2015; Blattman and Dercon, 2016);
similarly, frictions may prevent firms and workers from making matches that workers are
happy to keep. Workers thus may spend many years moving in and out of jobs, figuring out
what sort of work suits then and the wages they can reasonably expect to earn.
What role can policy play to help young people and firms to find good matches? This paper
tests whether a key friction in the labour market is simply a lack of contact between firms and
workers — who may, respectively, be struggling to assess the relative merit of a particular
worker, and struggling to assess the value of working at a particular firm. By allowing both
sides of the market to meet, we test whether reducing these frictions allows workers and
firms to find better matches in the labour market. To do this, we randomly invite 250 firms
and 1000 unemployed job seekers to two job fairs in the centre of Addis Ababa. The firms
were some of largest firms in the city, across all of the main sectors, and almost all of them
were actively looking to hire new staff at the time of the fairs. The job-seekers, on the other
hand, were all young and looking for work, and had different education levels and diverse
backgrounds. Firms and workers met for a day, and suggested matches were made to facilitate
meetings. At one of the two job fairs the job seekers attending were randomly selected to
receive a certification intervention. We randomise invitations both for firms and workers.
The fairs are a new method of recruitment in this market.1 The usual method of job search
and recruitment centres around centrally located job vacancy boards, where firms post va-
cancies. Workers visit these boards, apply selectively, and firms assess workers on the basis
of their CVs. This process is subject to high search costs for workers, and information asym-
metries, because of the limited information contained in CVs (Abebe et al., 2016). The fairs
were designed to cut down the costs involved in this process by bringing workers and jobs
together directly, thus lowering the costs of finding a good match. At the fairs, both workers
and firms have the opportunity to assess a large number of candidates at the same time, and
1 Fairs have been used in this context by very large firms (such as large multi-national firms), but their use
is not widespread.
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draw inference about the distribution of job and worker quality, respectively. They are able
to have meetings, make applications, and conduct interviews with zero effective marginal
cost.
We find that the fairs generate a rich set of interactions between workers and firms. We
estimate that 75% of workers at the fairs had an interview or in-depth discussion with a
recruiter.2 Among those who had meetings with firms, 11% report meeting with at least
one firm after the job fair for a more formal interview. In total, the fairs lead to 105 job
interviews. However, these meetings and interviews lead to only fourteen accepted jobs.3 We
therefore find no average impact of the job fairs on job seekers’ main employment outcomes
at endline. Similarly, we find no impact on firms’ hiring outcomes in the last year, nor on
the types of workers they hired.
Why did the fairs not create more jobs? We reject that the firms at the fair were not
interested in looking for candidates. Most firms did hire many candidates outside of the job
fairs, and firms typically spend a great deal of time and money on recruitment, receiving
many formal applications. Similarly, job seekers search hard for employment, both at the
fairs and elsewhere. Since our sample of job seekers was drawn in a representative way from
the population of young, educated unemployed people in this labour market, and we find
no evidence of negative selection into attendance, we do not think that firms just met an
unusually weak entry level candidates.
Instead, firms are reluctant to hire entry-level workers who were present at the fairs for high-
skill, professional positions — preferring to firm their recruits among employed workers at
other firms, with formal work experience. Firms were disappointed with the quality of the
applicants they met at the fairs: they reported that they were, on average, less employable
than the applicants they usually see by direct applications. By comparison, firms were in-
terested in hiring attendees with no tertiary education for low-skill positions: we find that
firms made 55 job offers to low skilled workers, of which fewer than 15% were accepted. It
seems that low skilled workers had unrealistically high expectations of the wages they could
earn in these positions.
What do firms and workers learn from this (disappointing) experience at the job fairs? We
find clear evidence that both firms and workers redouble efforts to search for work through
formal channels after the fairs. Firms increase their advertising and recruitment at the main
job vacancy boards. Workers increase their job search at those boards. For the workers, these
effects are concentrated among low-type workers with low predicted probability of finding a
good job. They also adjust downwards their reservation wages to more realistic levels. This
2 Roughly 60% of invited workers came to the fairs.
3 This is confirmed in the reports of both workers and firms.
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combination of increased job search and more realistic expectations leads to considerably
improved employment outcomes for low-type workers. By contrast, the fairs seem to be a
discouraging experience for higher type workers, who learnt that firms have high experience
requirements for formal jobs. They do not adjust their reservation wages, and in fact lower
their aspirations. They are less likely to have good jobs at endline, and more likely to have
switched to self-employment.
This is the first experiment, to our knowledge, to try to study the effects of labour market
matching programs on both workers and firms. A growing but relatively new literature looks
at the effects of labour market interventions that aim to reduce information asymmetries on
job search outcomes. The closest study to ours is Beam (2016), where workers are encouraged
to attend a job fair in the Philippines geared towards placing workers in overseas jobs. The
paper focusses on a remote rural sample of workers who were not necessarily actively looking
for jobs in an urban labour market, and finds that the job fairs changed people’s perceptions of
the labour market and encouraged job search in big cities (but had no effect on the probability
of working overseas). Similarly Jensen (2012) finds that remote rural dwellers increase their
employment when they are given information about available vacancies at nearby towns (see
also Bassi and Nansamba (2017)).
Instead, we focus on a sample of active job-seekers who already know the labour market
well. Our design is not intended to introduce workers to a new labour market or to motivate
them to start looking for work. Rather, we aim to look at how lower barriers to talking
to formal firms can improve workers’ chances of getting jobs, and update their information
about the jobs they are already looking to get. Similar work focussing on information frictions
in large labour market includes Groh et al. (2015), who try to match workers and firm on
the basis of observable characteristics. They are unable to get workers to take up offers for
jobs and interviews, who seem to opt to remain unemployed to look for better work. Pallais
(2014) shows how providing information about workers’ abilities, which they can credibly
communicate to hiring firms, can improve their prospects in an online labour market.4 Finally,
Abebe et al. (2016) conduct two parallel field experiments on how to get job seekers into jobs.
They find that improving job-seekers’ ability to engage in directed search through the existing
channels increases their probability of finding a good job. In the second experiment, they find
that improving job-seekers’ applications — with a certification programme based on detailed
testing — also improves employment outcomes, by making job search more effective. We
extend this literature not only by testing job fairs as a new kind of intervention to reduce
information frictions, but also by studying both sides of the market. We collect data on the
recruitment decisions of firms where our job seekers looked for work, and we estimate the
4 See also Horton (2017), who shows that algorithmic recommendations can increase hiring in the same online
market. Stanton and Thomas (2015) shows that intermediaries in online markets can help workers and firms
to overcome information asymmetries.
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impact of the job fairs on the firms by randomly providing invitations to some of the firms.
While a literature from developing countries suggests that job-placement services have large
short-run effects on employment outcomes (Card et al., 2010), other work has shown that
these effects could be displacing other workers (Cre´pon et al., 2013).5 A key research question
is whether improved matching through any interventions of this kind can improve firms’
ability to hire good workers; whether this is possible or not has important implications for
whether such interventions can have an impact on the total number of jobs available, or
whether the positive effects of all such programs are likely to be displaced elsewhere.6
We contribute to a literature on how biased beliefs can lead to sub-optimal job search and
employment decisions (Spinnewijn, 2015). DellaVigna et al. (2016) and Krueger and Mueller
(2016) show that recent income levels can cause the unemployed to anchor their reservation
wages at levels that are too high. Our results suggest that the unemployed set their reservation
wages too high because of unrealistic expectations of wages in big formal firms, which seems
to stem specifically from a lack of contact with those firms.7 Our results is the first evidence,
to our knowledge, that formal employment rates can be increased through interventions that
bring reservation wages down to more realistic levels.8
There is almost no experimental work focussing on firm recruitment.9 While a growing li-
terature uses field experiments with firms to test for binding constraints to growth faced
by those firms (Bandiera et al., 2011), relatively little attention has been paid to how firms
may be constrained by their inability to find the right workers to hire.10 A large literature
looks at how firm human resource management can improve firm performance Bloom and
Van Reenen (2011). In a developing country context (Bloom et al., 2010) show that impro-
ved human resource management practices, which include, for instance, performance-based
incentive systems for workers, can improve firm productivity. There is relatively little work
5 Other studies looking at the partial equilibrium effects of job search assistance programs include Altmann
et al. (2015), Dammert et al. (2015), and Graversen and Van Ours (2008).
6 Hardy and McCasland (2015) show that very small firms seem to be labour constrained: the introduction of
improved screening mechanisms improves revenues and profits. A long literature suggests that job referrals
can be used by information constrained firms to learn about work ability; see for example, Pallais and Sands
(2016) and Heath (2016).
7 By constrast, evidence from South Africa suggests that reservation wages are not out line of available wages,
and thus are not a contributor to the unemployment problem (Nattrass and Walker, 2005).
8 Groh et al. (2015) suggest that young people choose unemployment due to preferences over non-wage
benefits. By contrast, workers in our sample do not reject offers to remain unemployed. They seem to
increase their search effort, and indeed find jobs shortly after the fairs in other positions.
9 One notable exception is Hoffman et al. (2015), who show that firms can improve the quality of workers
hired by limiting managerial discretion in hiring and relying more directly in standardized test results. In
another experiment related to ours Hardy and McCasland (2015) study the use of an apprentice placement
system, which they argue can be used as a novel screening mechanisms for firms.
10 Work on audit studies (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) suggest that firms face time constraints that in
some cases lead them to make sub-optimal hiring decisions based on statistical discrimination.
5
on recruitment and hiring as a tool of human resource management.11 We contribute to this
literature by studying how firms recruit, in a developing country, and by looking at how they
respond to an opportunity to recruit in a completely new way.
2 Data
2.1 Surveys of job seekers
We run the job fairs study with a representative sample of young unemployed people in Addis
Ababa. To draw this sample, we first defined geographic clusters using the Ethiopian Central
Statistical Agency (CSA) enumeration areas.12 Our sampling frame excluded clusters within
2.5 km of the centre of Addis Ababa, and clusters outside the city boundaries. Clusters
were selected at random from our sampling frame, with the condition that directly adjacent
clusters could not be selected, to minimise potential spill-over effects across clusters.
In each selected cluster, we used door-to-door sampling to construct a list of all individuals in
the cluster who: (i) were 18 or older, but younger than 30; (ii) had completed high school; (iii)
were available to start working in the next three months; and (iv) were not currently working
in a permanent job or enrolled in full time education. We randomly sampled individuals from
this list to be included in the study. Our lists included individuals with different levels of
education. We sampled with higher frequency from the groups with higher education. This
ensured that individuals with vocational training and university degrees are well represented
in the study. All selected individuals were contacted for an interview.
We completed baseline interviews with 4388 eligible respondents. We attempted to contact
individuals by phone for at least a month (three months, on average); we dropped individuals
who could not be reached after at least three attempted calls. We also dropped any individual
who had found a permanent job and who retained the job for at least six weeks. Finally, we
dropped individuals who had migrated away from Addis Ababa during the phone survey. In
all we were left with 4059 individuals who were are included in our experimental study.
We collected data on study participants through both face-to-face and phone interviews.
We completed baseline face-to-face interviews between May and July 2014 and endline inter-
11 Oyer and Schaefer (2010) review the literature on hiring, writing, “The literature has been less successful
at explaining how firms can find the right employees in the first place. Economists understand the broad
economic forces–matching with costly search and bilateral asymmetric information–that firms face in trying
to hire. But the main models in this area treat firms as simple black-box production functions. Less work
has been done to understand how different firms approach the hiring problem, what determines the firm-level
heterogeneity in hiring strategies, and whether these patterns conform to theory.”
12 CSA defines enumeration areas as small, non-overlapping geographical areas. In urban areas, these typically
consist of 150 to 200 housing units.
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views between June and August 2015. We collected information about the socio-demographic
characteristics of study participants, their education, work history, finances and their expec-
tations and attitudes. We also include a module to study social networks. We call all study
participants through the duration of the study. In these interviews we administer a short
questionnaire focused on job search and employment.13
We have low attrition; in the endline survey, we find 93.5% of all job-seekers. We cannot
reject the null hypothesis that there are no differences in attrition rates between treatment
and control individuals when we study each treatment individually, or when we run a joint
test for all treatments. A number of covariates predict attrition. Since neither these variables
are correlated with treatment, we are not worried that this is affecting our results. Table A.7
in the Online Appendix presents the analysis of attrition. Attrition in the phone survey is
also low; for example, we still contact 90% of respondents in the final month. Figure A.1 in
the Online Appendix shows the trajectory of monthly attrition rates over the course of the
phone survey.14
2.2 Surveys of firms
We surveyed 498 large firms in Addis Ababa. We sampled these firms to be representative
of the largest employers in the city, stratified by sector. We included all major sectors in
the economy, including construction, manufacturing, banking and financial services, hotels
and hospitality, and other professional services. To sample firms, we constructed a list of the
largest 2,178 firms in Addis Ababa. Since no firm census exists for Ethiopia, we formed our
own firm sample using a variety of data sources. In all, we gathered data from more than
eight different sources; many came from government-maintained lists of formal firms, from
each ministry for the respective sector covered by that ministry. For the manufacturing sector
we used a representative sample of the largest firms from the Large and Medium Enterprise
surveys, conducted by the Central Statistics Agency (CSA). Where firm size was available
for the various sources, we imposed a minimum size cut-off off of 40 workers. In other cases
we requested lists of the largest firms in each sector.
We drew the firms in our sample using sector-level weights that reflect the number of employ-
ers in that sector in the city. We constructed these weights using representative labour force
13 Franklin (2015) shows that high-frequency phone surveys of this type do not generate Hawthorne effects —
for example, they do not affect job-seekers’ responses during the endline interview.
14 We do not report attrition rates at the very beginning of the phone survey since many respondents were
only contacted for the first time in months 2 and 3 of the phone survey, either because they were surveyed
towards the end of the baseline survey, and because of lags in setting up the phone survey.
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data.15 The firms are, on average, very large by Ethiopian and African standards. The mean
number of employees per firm is 171.5 workers, but this masks considerable heterogeneity,
particularly in the ‘Tours & Hospitality’ sector, which is dominated by relatively small hotels
and restaurants. Average firm size, when this sector is excluded, is 326 workers per firm.
These firms size numbers are given in Table 1 below. Note that these numbers exclude casual
daily labourers: on average, firms report employing 34 casual labourers per day.
The firms in our sample are growing in size and looking to hire new workers. At the median,
the number of workers that firms expected to hire in the next 12 months amounts to 12% of
their current workforce. The median rate of hiring was highest (16%) among service sector
firms, which were also the most likely to come to the job fairs. The most common types of
workers which firms expected to hire were white collar workers, usually requiring university
degrees. These results are shown in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix.
2.3 Randomisation of job-seekers
We assign treatment at the level of geographic cluster, after blocking on cluster characteristics
(see Abebe et al. (2016) for further details). Our sample is balanced across all treatment and
control groups, and across a wide range of outcomes (including outcomes that were not used
in the randomisation procedure). We present extensive balance tests in Table . For each
baseline outcome of interest, we report the p-values for a test of the null hypothesis that all
experimental groups are balanced. We cannot reject this null for any of variables that we
study.
2.4 Randomisation of firms
We assigned firms to either a treatment group or a control group using block level randomi-
zation techniques suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Firms in the treatment group
were invited to attend the job fairs, while firms in the control group did not receive an invita-
tion. The following method was used to group firms together: firstly, firms were partitioned
by five main groups of industry (defined in Table A.4, in the Online Appendix). Then firms
were partitioned into nearest neighbour groups of four firms on the basis of Mahalanobis
15 Table A.4 in the Online Appendix shows the number of firms surveyed in our sample, divided into five main
categories. Column (2) provides weighted percentages obtained by applying the inverse of the weights used
to sample the firms. For instance we surveyed NGOs (“Education, Health, Aid”) relatively infrequently
because of the large number of NGOs in the data.
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distance defined over the set of baseline variables.16 After that we randomized the firms into
two groups in each block of four firms: two firms were invited to the job fairs, one firm on
each of the days, at random. The other two firms in the group were assigned to the control
group, who were not to be invited to the fairs.
Additionally, we assigned treatment using a re-randomisation method. Following the recom-
mendations of Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), we will control in our estimations for the baseline
covariates used for re-randomisation (that is, the set of variables described in Table 2) and
for the baseline covariates used to construct the randomisation blocks.17
With this sample we have 78% power to detect a small treatment effect on the total number of
pay-roll employees (that is, only 0.2 standard deviations), using a significance level of 0.05%.
3 Design and Implementation
3.1 The job fairs
We invited treated job-seekers and treated firms to attend two job fairs. The first fair took
place on October 25 and 26, 2014. The second fair took place on 14 and 15 February, 2015.
We ran two fairs to ensure that each job-seeker and firm would have the chance to participate
in at least one of them. The job fairs were held at the Addis Ababa University campus, a
central and well-known location in the capital city. To minimise congestion, each job fair
lasted two days and only half of the firms and job-seekers were invited to attend on each
day. The firms that were invited to attend on Saturday 25th (Sunday 26th) of October were
then invited to attend on Sunday 15th (Saturday 14th) of February. On the other hand,
job-seekers invited to attend on the Saturday (Sunday) of the first fair were also invited to
attend on the Saturday (Sunday) of the second fair. This ensured that, in each job fair,
job-seekers were exposed to a different pool of firms and firms were exposed to a different
pool of job-seekers.
At the beginning of both fairs, we gave job-seekers (i) a list of all firms invited to the fair
and (ii) a list of recommended meetings. We created these recommended meetings using
information on firms’ vacancies obtained from the phone survey which we ran shortly before
the fairs (see the data section). After creating a ranking of workers for each vacancy and
16 These are listed in Table A.5 in the Online Appendix.
17 Details of these variables and how they are defined are contained in our detailed pre-analysis plan.
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a ranking of vacancies for each worker, a matching algorithm matched workers and firms;
we discuss this shortly. In the second fair, we introduced two further elements. First, we
gave job-seekers the list of all vacancies, on top of the list of firms. Second, we gave firms
a list of all job-seekers invited to the fairs, with some information about their educational
qualifications and previous work experience. We asked firms to indicate up to 10 job-seekers
whom they would like to talk to at the job fair. These ‘requested meetings’ were posted on
a small board a few hours after the beginning of the fair. We plan to do in-depth analysis
using data on recommended and requested meetings in future drafts of the paper.
During each fair, workers and firms were free to interact as they preferred. Each firm set up a
stall before the job seekers arrived. These stalls were typically staffed by the firm’s HR team,
who brought with them printed material advertising the firms. In a typical interaction, a job-
seeker would approach the stall of a firm and ask questions about the firm and its vacancies.
The firm’s HR staff would then often also ask about the job-seeker’s skills and experience
and check his or her CV. If the job-seeker looked suitable for one of the vacancies, the firm
would then invite her or him to attend a formal job interview a few days after the job fair.
We did not restrict the invitation to the fair to unemployed job-seekers or to firms that had
open vacancies. However, only about 8% of job-seekers had permanent jobs by the time of
the first job fair, and thus most job-seekers were still searching for work. Similarly, most firms
were hiring during the period that the job fairs were held. 89% hired at least one worker in
the year of the experiment. On average firms hired 52 workers in the year and 4 workers in
the month after the job fairs.
In total, we invited 1,007 job-seekers and 248 firms to attend fairs. Both job-seekers and
firms were contacted over the phone, were given some information about the nature of the
fairs and had the opportunity to ask questions. 606 job-seekers attended at least one fair:
a 60% take-up rate. The most common reason that job-seekers gave for not attending the
fairs was that they were busy during that particular weekend. This reason was given by 226
job-seekers in the first fair and 229 job-seekers in the second fair. Other reasons included
not being able to take up a job at that time (83 respondents for the second fair, but only
nine respondents for the first fair) and finding that the fair venue was too difficult to reach
(31 respondents for the first fair and 25 respondents for the second fair). We find that very
few baseline characteristics predict this attendance. This reassures us that our results are
not driven by negative selection of workers into attendance. In fact the two variables that
do predict attendance positively are search effort at baseline, and the use of certificates for
job search at baseline: it seems that workers who attended the fairs are the more active,
organized, jobs seekers. Those who attended are more likely to have a university degree or
diploma, though the effect is not significant.
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Similarly, 170 firms attended at least one job fair: a take-up rate of 68.5%. Of the firms that
did not attend the fairs, 12% reported that this was because they did not have vacancies at the
time. The remaining firms often cited reasons related to logistics and previous commitments.
13 firms reported that they thought they would not find the job fairs useful.
3.2 The matching algorithm
We provided each job-seeker with a personalised list of 15 firms that we suggested he or she
should talk to during the job fair; each firm received a symmetric personalised list, showing
the names of all those job-seekers who had been recommended to meet that firm. We formed
the list of 15 firms in two distinct ways. First, we used a Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance
algorithm to recommend 10 of the matches (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Second, we augmented
this list by randomly selecting five additional matches. We randomised the order in which
the 15 matches were presented.
In this context, the matching algorithm was applied as a computational tool to suggest
sensible matches, given baseline characteristics on both job-seekers and firms. To this end,
we constructed stylised synthetic rankings of vacant positions (for each job-seeker), and of
job-seekers (for each firm). We constructed firm rankings of job-seekers using lexicographic
preferences over (i) whether the job-seeker’s occupation matched that of the vacancy, then (ii)
job-seekers’ educational qualifications, and then (iii) the job-seekers’ number of years in wage
employment. We constructed job-seeker rankings of vacancies using a simple ranking over the
advertised wage (that is, we applied identical rankings for each job-seeker). Of course, these
rankings were not intended literally to represent the true preferences of participants; rather,
they were intended to provide a simple method of purposive matching given a heterogeneous
set of vacancies and job-seeker skills. With these rankings in hand, we then looped 10
times over the Gale-Shapley Algorithm; for each iteration of the loop, we formed a stable
assignment, subject to the constraint that we not match any firm and job-seeker who had
been matched in any earlier iteration.
Figure 1 illustrates the output of the ranking algorithm. Each point represents a match
recommended by the algorithm; the graph shows which combinations of firm rankings and
job-seeker rankings generated these recommended matches. The graph illustrates that the
algorithm worked well — in the sense of generally generating matches between firms and
job-seekers who were, at least on the basis of job-seeker skills and experience, reasonably
suitable for each other. Note the substantial mass at the bottom-left of the graph; this shows
that, at least for those firms paying reasonably well, the algorithm recommended matches of
suitable occupational fit. (For example, for firms in the top 100 of job-seekers’ rankings, the
median match was to a job-seeker with a firm ranking of just 14.)
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4 Results: Average Effects
4.1 Impact on firms
In this section, we analyse the impact of the job fairs on our sample of firms; this follows our
pre-analysis plan.18 We divide outcomes into families. For each outcome of interest we use
an ITT approach with an ANCOVA specification; we also include the set of covariates used
for the randomisation. We use robust standard errors.19 Specifically, we estimate:
yi = β0 + β1 · fairsi + α · yi,pre + δ · xi0 + µi (1)
In this specification, the ‘balance’ variables included in xi0 are all the variables listed in Table
2. Variable yic,pre is the dependent variable measured at baseline. Throughout this analysis we
distinguish between professional workers and non-professional workers. ‘Professional workers’
refers to traditional notions of ‘white-collar employees’: typically those with some degree
or diploma, working in relatively highly-trained positions. For manufacturing firms, ‘non-
professional workers’ refers mostly to labourers or ‘production’ workers; for service-based
firms, these include mostly ‘client services’ (tellers, waiters, receptionists, etc.) The main
results on firm outcomes are presented in Tables 3, 4, 10, and 5; in each table, we show each
regression as a row, in which we report the estimated ITT (βˆ1), the mean of the control group,
and the number of observations. In each case, we report both p-values and False Discovery
Rate q-values, taken across the family of outcomes (Benjamini et al., 2006).
First, in Table 3, we test whether the fairs had an impact on firms’ recruitment processes,
as measured by firms’ ability to fill vacancies. We find no impact on these outcomes, nor
on how long it took fill positions that were made available, nor on firms’ reported costs
of recruitment. We do find a small but significant positive impact of the fairs on unfilled
vacancies. That is, firms reported having more vacancies that they were unable to fill during
the year. (However, this effect becomes marginally insignificant after we apply multiple
hypothesis testing corrections.)
In Table 4, we then look at the impact of the job fairs on firm hiring outcomes at the main
endline survey, which took place about six months after the second job fair. We find that
18 This is available at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1495.
19 We do not cluster our errors since randomisation was conducted at the firm level.
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no significant impact on the number of people hired by the firms in the last 12 months, nor
on the types of people hired by the firms, whether it be hiring of candidates with degrees,
or hiring more candidates on permanent contracts. This suggests that the job fairs did not
significantly change how, and whom, firms hired, over the 12 month period.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, we find no impact of the firms overall work-force composition (Table
5). We asked firms about their entire current workforce (not just workers hired in the last
few months). We find no impacts on the types of contracts held by different workers, their
starting salaries, or the firms assessment of how well qualified their workers are, on average.
4.2 Impact on job seekers
We use the same specification as equation 1 to analyse the ITT for job-seekers; we report
results in Tables 6, A.1 and 7. These tables show regressions of key employment and search
outcomes at an endline survey conducted four months after the second job fair. We cluster
errors at the level of the enumeration area in which respondents live, to correct for the fact
that the treatments were randomized at the level of the enumeration area. As in our earlier
results, we report both conventional p-values and False Discovery Rate q-values.
We find no average effect on either endline employment outcomes or search methods. This
is hardly surprising, in light of our results on firms. Table 6 reports effects on employment
outcomes. The effect on key job quality outcomes such as ‘formal’ work or ‘permanent’ work
are positive, but not significant. (These estimates are very much in line with the results
suggesting that about 14 job seekers found jobs at the large formal firms at the job fairs,
which would not doubt have been formal and permanent contracts; this effect would register
as a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability of having such a job.) We find that the
fairs have no impacts on the types of jobs held by workers either.20
Table 7, we consider average effects on search methods. We find that treated individuals
were more likely to have found jobs by interview. Similarly, we find that treated respondents
20 These results can be found in Table A.1 in the online appendix, which reports effects on employment
amenities.
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were more successful in converting job applications into interviews, and then into offers,
when applying for permanent jobs. However, each of these three results are only marginal
significant, and not robust to our multiple hypothesis correction.
5 Why did we not create more hires?
Why did our fairs not generate more hires, and what can we learn from this about matching
in this labour market? We explore two main types of explanations for our results: first, that
the fairs didn’t generate enough interaction between workers and firms to allow for hiring
to happen (suggesting that fairs are not an appropriate mechanism for screening workers,
or that they were badly executed events in our case), and second, we look at whether there
simply were not good matches available at the fairs.
5.1 Did the fairs provide enough scope for interaction?
We find that 454 job-seekers (75% of those attending) interacted with at least one firm at the
job fair, according to job-seekers’ reports. Of these, 69 job-seekers (11%) were then formally
interviewed after the job fairs. The same job-seeker would typically contact multiple firms
and would sometimes be interviewed by more than one firm. In total, we record 2191 contacts
between firms and workers and 105 interviews. Finally, we find that 76 job offers were made
at the fairs (to 45 job seekers); in total, 14 job-seekers (2%) were hired. Overall, the job-
seekers who attended a fair secured one interview every 21 informal inquires with the firms,
one job offer every 1.4 interview and one job every 6.2 interviews approximately. Between
our baseline and endline interview, on the other hand, job-seekers in our sample obtained
an interview every 3.5 job applications, an offer every 1.9 interviews, and a job every 3.3
interviews. From these numbers, two conclusions emerge. First, there was rich interaction
between firms and job-seekers at the fairs. Second, this interaction lead to surprisingly few
good matches. In this section, we combine data from job-seekers and from firms to explore
this second finding.
We begin by exploring whether the more suitable worker-firm pairs attending the fair — ac-
cording to the rankings we created and the matching algorithm we ran — were likely to meet.
We interpret this as a basic descriptive test of coordination: do participants’ rankings predict
meetings? And, following this, do participants’ synthetic rankings also predict meetings? To
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test this, we estimate the following dyadic regression models:
(2)meetfw = β0 + β1 · Rankfw + β2 · Rankwf + µfw
meetfw = β0 + β1 · Gale Shapleyfw + β2 · Randomfw + µfw. (3)
Depending on the regression, meetfw is a dummy capturing either whether firm f requested
a meeting with worker w, or whether firm f and worker w had an actual meeting. We use a
two-way cluster, clustering standard errors both at the level of the firm and at the level of the
worker (Cameron et al., 2011). We report model estimates in Table 8 below, which we obtain
using the sample of workers and firms who attended the fairs. We find that both rankings
and algorithmic recommendations are predictive of both requested and actual meetings. The
effects are large and significant. Moving from the highest to the lowest rank is associated
with an almost 100 percent decrease in the probability of a requested meeting, and about a
halving of the probability of an actual meeting. Further matches suggested by the algorithm
are about 200 percent more likely to happen than matches that were not suggested to workers.
On the other hand, the coefficient on randomly suggested matches is much smaller and is
never significant. In one specification we can reject that the two coefficients are equal at the
5 percent level. In the other specifications, the F -test is on the margin of significance. We
interpret these figures as suggesting that suitable worker-firm pairs were likely to meet at the
job fairs. This rules out that market design issues such as congestion and miscoordination
prevented suitable pairs from meeting each other during the job fairs.
5.2 Were there not enough good matches available at the fairs?
Prior to arriving at the fairs, firms were surveyed to ask about their current vacancies: a
roster of different positions for which, at the time, they were looking to hire. On average,
we find that each firm was looking to hire for two different occupations, and had a total of
seven vacancies available. Only 30% of reporting firms told us that they had no vacancies at
all. In total, going into the fair, firms were hiring for 711 different vacancies, and looking to
hire a total of 1751 workers. The occupational composition of the vacancies available at the
firms exhibits considerable overlap with the occupation composition of the job seekers invited
to the job fairs. Therefore, we can rule out that the firms did not have sufficient vacancies.
We can also rule out that firms did not interact sufficiently with workers. On average, each
firm reports meeting 20 job-seekers through the job fairs that they attended. In the second
job fair, we asked firms — based on list of job-seekers’ qualifications — whether there were
individuals whom they were interested in interviewing. Most responded positively, by listing
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names of several candidates who were of interest to them.
We would only see hires if the expected returns to hiring someone with a signal observed
at the fair was higher than the expected quality of the best recruit made through the usual
hiring channels. Indeed firms may have already received applications for the positions that
they had open at the time of the fairs. If we assume that the job fairs did work for firms as
a low cost route to get a more accurate signal of worker ability, then firms must assess the
quality of a candidate for whom they have a very tight signal of ability against a range of
anonymous CVs received as applications. If the workers at the fairs simply were not very
employable, it would be unlikely that firms would be likely to invite them for interviews.
If they were invited to the interview stage, they would only be hired if they were indeed
stronger candidates than all other interviewees.
Were the workers who attended the fairs negatively selected from our sample of workers?
Only about 60% of workers came to the fairs: if only those with very low education, motiva-
tion and prospects of employment arrived, it is perhaps not surprising that they didn’t get
hired. In Table A.3 we regress job-seekers’ attendance at the fairs on a rich set of baseline
characteristics; we find no evidence that observably weaker candidates attended. In fact,
the only two outcomes that robustly predict attendance were related to search motivation:
those who were searching the most at baseline, and who were using formal certificates to
search were mostly likely to attend. Education, gender, and even employment do not predict
attendance. We do find that invited youth who were already working at permanent jobs at
the time of the fairs were slightly less likely to attend, but the effect is unlikely to be driving
our results: 4% of attendants at the fairs had permanent jobs, relative to only 5.6% of the
total sample.
5.2.1 Education and experience mismatch?
Given our random sampling strategy, the job seekers in attendance could thus be said to be
representative of the population of young, educated job-seekers. Perhaps large firms simply
do not hire from this population? In other words, could it be that young people who struggle
to find a job immediately out of education will never be able to find work at a formal firm,
and thus any hopes of active labour market policies to get young people into work are doomed
to fail?
We certainly do find that firms prefer to hire from a population that is it different to the one
at the fairs. Most importantly, firms place a high premium on work experience. In the phone
questionnaire after the second job fair, we asked firms to rate the most employable job-seekers
they met at the job fair, compared to the candidates whom the firm would have selected for
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interviews through its normal recruitment channels. Only 12 percent of firms report that
the most employable job-seeker at the fair would be in the top 20 percent of candidates in
their usual recruitment round. 54 percent of firms, on the other hand, report that the most
employable job-seeker at the fair would be in the bottom 50 percent of candidates in their
usual recruitment. This is is consistent with the fact that the most common reasons firms
reported for not hiring more job-seekers at the fairs are ‘insufficient work experience’ (34%
of firms) and ‘wrong educational qualifications’ (23%). On the other side of the market,
even workers themselves report that they did not have the required experience for the firms
present at the job fairs. Many reported that firms ‘asked for experience’, which few of them
have in the formal sector. More than 65% reported that the main problem with the fairs was
that there weren’t enough jobs for which they were qualified.
However, we also find evidence that firms do hire entry level workers without previous normal
experience. After the job fair, we interviewed all firms about the vacancies they were had
open before the fairs and how successful they were at filling them. 424 firms hired 2018
workers in one month after the job fairs. We find that more than 30% of vacancies were
filled with average experience of zero years. Because firms often hired many people at once
to fill a particular vacancy, and because they hired more workers for vacancies not requiring
experience, this translates into 65% of all hires made around the time of the fairs being filled
with inexperienced workers. We compare these hiring patterns to the same firms’ intentions
when they posted these vacancies: only 13% of vacancies (or a total of 33% of workers the firm
intended to hire) were meant to workers with no experience. This suggests that firms strongly
prefer work experience, but are often forced to hire the best entry level candidate that the
can, due to a lack of suitable candidates. Attendance at the job fair had no discernible effect
on whether firms hired entry level candidates.
Finally, we note that our job-seekers were not mismatched in terms of education. A substan-
tial proportion of our sample (31%) had not continued to post-secondary education. However,
55% of firm hires made after the fair, and 28% of all vacancies filled, were of job-seekers who
had not finished high-school.
5.2.2 Mismatched expectations
It is not implausible, then, that firms might have hired the types of workers attending the
fairs. However, there may have been other kinds of mismatch leading to a lack of hires at
the fairs. In this section, we explore the related roles of expectations and reservation wages.
In particular, we find that firms came to the fairs with the expectation that they would
be hiring highly skilled professionals, for which higher education (degree or diploma) was
essential. Hiring lower skilled workers for low wage jobs does not usually recruit considerable
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recruitment effort on the part of firms, so the fairs were seen as a chance to head-hunt the
best candidates.
So why were our highly educated workers, with university degrees, not hired at the fairs?
Firms report paying their new recruits with university degrees an average of 4500 Birr per
month. This sum lies well above the reservation wages of university graduates at the fairs:
this was 2500 Birr at the median, and only 10% of workers in our sample had reservation
wages above the average paid for professionals at these firms. So it is unlikely that the workers
were not interested in the high-skill positions available at the fairs.
Rather, a key constraint emerges: firms hiring for high-skilled professional position put a par-
ticular premium on work experience for these positions. In particular, only 22% of vacancies
filled by workers with post-secondary education were filled by workers with no experience,
compared to 52% of vacancies filled for high-school graduates (or below). Yet very few of the
tertiary educated job seekers in our sample had any experience at all (only 20% had had any
kind formal work experiences). Firms may have been unwilling to hire them because of the
costs of training a worker with no experience, or to take the risk of hiring someone without
a reference letter from a previous employee.
By contrast, however, lower-skilled workers may have had over-inflated expectations about
the salaries they could aspire to in the market. We explore this possibility in Table 9. Workers
without degrees in our sample report reservation wages with median 1400 Birr per month.
Yet firms that hired individuals with no degree (or diploma) and no experience paid a median
wage of only 855 Birr. It may be the case that any possible low-skilled vacancies that might
have been filled at the fairs did not happen because the workers were unhappy with the
wages they were offered. So, even though firms have been willing to hire entry level workers
without experience, the workers did not take the offers because of unrealistic expectations.
Recall that workers reported receiving quite a few job offers at the fairs, but only 33% of
workers accepted at least one of those offers. Do the offers and rejections fit with this story of
mismatched expectations across different levels of education? We find that a total of 76 offers
were made to 45 different workers. Of those offers fully 55 were made to low skilled workers,
with the remaining 21 going to those with diplomas or degrees. All offers made to low-skilled
workers were to workers with no previous work experience. The low skilled workers accepted
only 8 of those positions (14.5%) while higher skilled workers accepted 6 (28.5%).
It also seems that workers and firms had mismatched expectations: firms have may have
overestimated the ease with which they could find experienced workers with tertiary education
at the fairs; workers with degrees may have been impressed by the salaries on offer by the
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firms, but disappointed to find that the experience required to get those jobs was beyond
their reach. Finally, while firms seem to have met low educated workers at the fairs and had
an interest in hiring them, these firms were used to recruiting such workers very easily, and
with low wages, on the open market. The job seekers at the fairs, though ambitious, may
have been surprised to hear how little even these formal firms were offering for low skilled
positions. In the next section we study how the experience of attended the fairs may have
influence the expectations of both workers and firms, and thus may have altered their job
search and recruitment behaviour.
6 Indirect effects and learning
The job fairs did not generate very many hires. But workers and firms came into the fairs
with mismatched expectations about the types of matches they were likely to make. Did the
fairs have some impact on their search and recruitment behaviour after the fairs?
To answer this question, we now explore changes in job-seekers’ search behaviour and in firms’
recruitment activities. We find clear evidence that both job-seekers and firms increased their
efforts at search through formal channels. In particular, workers were more likely to visit the
job boards during the weeks after the job fairs. Figure 2 below plots the fortnight-specific
treatment effect of the job fairs, relative to fortnight 0 (when the first job fairs were held) and
fortnight 8 (when the second job fair was held). These effects were estimated using weekly
phone call surveys conducted with all job seekers in our sample, throughout the course of the
study. We find significant effects — albeit short-lived — on the probability of visiting the
job boards after each of the two fairs.
In Table 10, we study the impacts on firms’ recruitment activities outside of the job fairs.
That is, we asked firms about their methods of advertising for vacant positions, and whether
they conducted interviews with the applicants who applied. We find that firms invited to the
job fairs were about six percentage points more likely in the last 12 months to have advertised
for new hires (on a control mean of about 79%); they were 12 percentage points more likely to
have advertised for professional positions (control mean: about 60%). They were also more
likely to be using the job vacancy boards: the main place for attracting formal applications.
All three results are significant, including after controlling for multiple hypothesis testing.
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This suggests that the fairs increased beliefs about the returns to searching for jobs through
the usual formal methods, for both workers and firms that attended. The discussion in the
previous section suggests that these impacts on beliefs should differ between high- and low-
skilled workers. Low-skilled workers came to the fairs with unrealistically high expectations
of the wages they could earn if they were hired, while the high-skilled workers were over-
optimistic about their chances of finding a job without a strong record of work previous work
experience.
To pursue this analysis further, we look at how different workers were influenced differently
by the fairs. First, we find that job seekers with worse employment prospects (lower educa-
tion, and no previous work experience) are driving the overall effect on formal job search. We
generate a single measure of labour market attachment, based on the predicted probability
of finding a permanent or formal job at endline determined with a set of pre-specified base-
line covariates, and using the ‘leave-one-out’ estimator developed by Abadie et al. (2013).21
We find that the strongest predictors of permanent work at endline are education, use of
certificates in applications, and previous work experience. While women and individuals li-
ving further from the city have lower labour market attachment on average, they are not
significantly worse after controlling for education and experience.
In Figure 3, we look at the shape of treatment effects by baseline predictions of access to
good work; we look separately at the number of visits to the job boards (Panel A) and at
the probability of having permanent work in the past week (Panel B). In each case, we show
point estimates and 90% confidence intervals for both treated and control job-seekers.
We find that job seekers with low predicted baseline probability of finding a good formal job
significantly increased their number of trips to the boards, with no similar effect for those
with a high labour market attachment (indeed, if anything, higher types reduce their job
search after the fairs, though the result is not significant). Further, in Panel B, we show that
this increased job search lead to significantly higher probability of finding a permanent job
for this low attachment group. Again, this increase in good employment is unlikely to have
come through direct hiring at the job fairs, but rather though the channel of increased job
search outside of the fairs. Interestingly, we also find suggestive evidence of negative impacts
on permanent employment among those with higher predicted probability of good work.
To test more formally for heterogeneous effects, we split our sample in two, at the median
of predicted probability of formal work, and study differences in the effect of the fairs in the
21 The results are robust to predicting just permanent work, and to using a larger range of dependent variables,
in addition to our core set of heterogeneity variables.
20
two groups. The results (in Figure 4) are stark: among the high-types, the fairs reduced
substantially the probability of having wage employment, and the probabilities of having
formal employment and permanent work — leading to a shift into self-employment. By
contrast, the low-types experience an increase in formal and permanent work. They are also
more likely to be working at larger firms. We find that overall the fair helped bring jobseekers
connect to large firms. In particular, individuals invited to the job fair are a significant 4.2
points (15 percent) more likely to work in a firm with more than 10 employees. These effects
are overwhelmingly concentrated among the low skilled workers. We confirm this result by
looking at heterogeneous outcomes according to whether a job seeker only completed high
school or went on to tertiary education. Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix confirms that
high school (low-skilled) graduates experienced increases in formal work, while those with
tertiary education were more likely to be in self-employment.
What could explain these effects? Recall that wages paid for high-skilled work by firms at the
fairs are much higher than reservation wages of workers, while wages page for low-skilled work
were much lower. If high-type workers have unrealistic expectations about their ability to get
high-paying formal jobs, they may have been unpleasantly surprised by the strict experience
requirements imposed by firms at the fairs. Given that many of the firms at the fair were
well-known brands in the local market, where they may have aspired to find work, this might
have lead them to give up hope for finding a good formal job. In response, they were less
likely to take wage employment, and shifted into the entrepreneurial sector. By contrast, the
low-types may also have been impressed by the wages available in higher-skilled positions,
but also realised that they were substantially over-estimating the wages available to them
from formal firms for low skill work. This may have prompted a stark realisation: the high-
skill professional jobs were much harder to get than they thought, while the the low-skilled
jobs that they were offered paid very low wages. They may have adjusted their expectations
downward. To test this, we test the effect of the job fairs on reservation wages. In Panel A
Figure 5, we find that low skilled workers significantly reduce their reservation wages after
the job fairs, while the higher type candidates did not. By contrast, higher type candidates
did become less optimistic about their prospects for being offered wage work: Panel B of 5
shows an increase the numbers of weeks that expected to wait for a job offer.
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7 Conclusion
We run a job fair in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where we bring together unemployed job-seekers
and firms looking to hire. We facilitate interactions between workers by suggesting matches
based a Gale-Shapley algorithm — and by providing information about workers education
and firms vacancies. We find that the workers who attended the fair were not very different
from the types whom the firms usually hired, and that the fairs generated a rich set of
interactions between workers and firms. However, only 14 workers were hired as a direct
result of interactions at the job fairs. Firms invited to the fairs were not significantly more
likely to hire; invited job-seekers were no more likely to find work.
The reasons for the failure of the job fairs to generate jobs provide several lessons about
the working of labour markets. Two key problems arose. First, for high-skilled professional
jobs, firms prefer to hire workers with more experience.22 Therefore, more educated job
seekers at the fairs received few offers at the fairs, and reported that they didn’t have the
required experience for this formal sector jobs. Second, for low-skilled vacancies, firms seemed
willing to hire at the fairs, but lower-skilled workers received offers comfortably below their
reservation wages; indeed, lower-skilled workers received many offers, but rejected most of
them.
We find evidence of learning in the aftermath of the fairs. High-skilled workers seem to have
realised that their lack of experience put most of these formal jobs beyond their reach. They
were less optimistic about their chances of finding work in the future, and less likely to be
engaged in formal employment, but more likely to be self-employment. Low-skilled workers
seem to have revised down their reservation wages after the fairs, and also to have significantly
increased their job search effort through formal methods. Four months after the job fairs,
they are considerably more likely to have found a formal job. In short, we conclude that
mismatched expectations — among both job-seekers and firms — can generate important
labour market frictions.
22 This is consistent with Tervio¨ (2009), who shows that firms can often over-invest in hiring among workers
with existing experience, instead of investing more in the recruitment of talented workers with less observable
skills.
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Table 3: Firm recruitment in the last year
Outcome Estimated ITT Control Mean Observations
Time taken to fill professional vacancies -2.344 24.11 338
(.238)
[.658]
Time taken to fill non-professional vacancies 0.724 15.66 109
(.679)
[.909]
Number of interviews per position (professional) 0.312 8.818 361
(.895)
[.909]
Pay per recruitment (professional) 746.7 2818 382
(.469)
[.909]
Pay per recruitment (non-professional) -437.8 1259 406
(.172)
[.658]
Proportion of vacancies unfilled, as percentage of vacancies opened 0.601 0.859 305
(.015)**
[.101]
Notes: Each row reports a separate regression. For each regression, we report the estimated ITT from parti-
cipating in the job fair, the mean in the control group, and the number of observations. p-values are reported
in parentheses; False Discovery Rate q-values are reported in square brackets.
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Table 4: Firm recruitment in the last year: Worker characteristics
Outcome Estimated ITT Control Mean Observations
Number of new hires for the year (professional) -1.604 11.73 472
(.551)
[1]
Number of new hires for the year (non-professional) -9.704 44.64 472
(.183)
[1]
Did firms mostly hire people with degrees (professional positions)? -0.00800 0.574 473
(.845)
[1]
Percentage of new hires hired in permanent positions (non-professional) -0.00900 0.892 337
(.76)
[1]
Percentage of new hires hired in permanent positions (professional) -0.00800 0.876 308
(.791)
[1]
Notes: Each row reports a separate regression. For each regression, we report the estimated ITT from parti-
cipating in the job fair, the mean in the control group, and the number of observations. p-values are reported
in parentheses; False Discovery Rate q-values are reported in square brackets.
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Table 5: Firms’ total workforce composition
Outcome Estimated ITT Control Mean Observations
Total number of employees -18.38 350.5 473
(.268)
[.847]
Proportion of professional workers on permanent contracts 0.0190 0.908 462
(.332)
[.847]
Proportion of non-professional workers on permanent contracts 0.0280 0.896 408
(.169)
[.67]
Average starting salary (professional) -90.01 4190 461
(.708)
[1]
Average starting salary (non-professional) 102.9 1059 400
(.417)
[.847]
Proportion of professional workers with degree -0.0570 0.645 461
(.033)**
[.366]
Proportion of workers with post-secondary education (non-professionals) 0.0370 0.355 407
(.172)
[.67]
Average worker is not under-qualified in any of the worker categories 0.00200 0.773 473
(.949)
[1]
Notes: Each row reports a separate regression. For each regression, we report the estimated ITT from parti-
cipating in the job fair, the mean in the control group, and the number of observations. p-values are reported
in parentheses; False Discovery Rate q-values are reported in square brackets.
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Table 6: Worker employment outcomes
Outcome Estimated ITT Control Mean Observations
Worked -0.0120 0.562 3786
(.731)
[1]
Hours worked -1.109 26.20 3779
(.559)
[1]
Formal work 0.0260 0.224 3786
(.192)
[1]
Permanent work 0.0180 0.171 3786
(.42)
[1]
Self-employed 0.00700 0.0950 3786
(.722)
[1]
Monthly earnings 75.70 1145 3733
(.417)
[1]
Satisfied with work 0.0340 0.237 3786
(.266)
[1]
Notes: Each row reports a separate regression. For each regression, we report the estimated ITT from parti-
cipating in the job fair, the mean in the control group, and the number of observations. p-values are reported
in parentheses; False Discovery Rate q-values are reported in square brackets.
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Table 7: Worker job search outcomes
Outcome Estimated ITT Control Mean Observations
Applied to temporary jobs 0.321 1.311 3770
(.241)
[.702]
Applied to permanent jobs 0.0420 2.279 3765
(.877)
[.938]
Interviews/Applications 0.0150 0.354 2140
(.678)
[.932]
Offers/Applications 0.00200 0.248 2141
(.976)
[.938]
Interviews/Applications (Perm) 0.0890 0.327 1660
(.077)*
[.702]
Offers/Applications (Perm) 0.0880 0.164 1659
(.099)*
[.702]
Interviews/Applications (Temp) -0.0680 0.389 1315
(.124)
[.702]
Offers/Applications (Temp) -0.0590 0.332 1315
(.29)
[.702]
Uses CV for applications -0.0160 0.401 3786
(.617)
[.932]
Uses certificates 0.0660 0.479 3786
(.222)
[.702]
Notes: Each row reports a separate regression. For each regression, we report the estimated ITT from parti-
cipating in the job fair, the mean in the control group, and the number of observations. p-values are reported
in parentheses; False Discovery Rate q-values are reported in square brackets.
33
T
ab
le
8
:
D
y
a
d
ic
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s:
R
a
n
k
in
g
s,
m
a
tc
h
e
s
a
n
d
m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
R
eq
u
es
te
d
A
ct
u
al
R
eq
u
es
te
d
A
ct
u
al
R
eq
u
es
te
d
A
ct
u
a
l
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
F
ir
m
ra
n
k
in
g
of
w
or
ke
rs
-.
00
6
-.
00
2
-.
0
06
-.
00
1
(.
0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
0
6
)∗
∗
(.
0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
0
6
)∗
∗
W
o
rk
er
ra
n
k
in
g
o
f
fi
rm
s
-.
00
2
-.
00
1
-.
0
02
-.
00
1
(.
0
0
2
)
(.
0
0
2
)
(.
0
0
2
)
(.
0
0
2
)
A
lg
o
ri
th
m
su
g
ge
st
io
n
.0
20
.0
15
.0
1
4
.0
1
4
(.
0
0
7
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
6
)∗
∗
(.
0
0
6
)∗
∗
(.
0
0
6
)∗
∗
R
an
d
o
m
su
g
ge
st
io
n
.0
00
6
.0
03
.0
0
09
.0
03
(.
0
0
6
)
(.
0
0
7
)
(.
0
0
6
)
(.
0
0
7
)
C
o
n
st
.
.0
27
.0
12
.0
12
.0
0
6
.0
2
6
.0
1
1
(.
0
0
4
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
4
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
1
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
4
)∗
∗∗
(.
0
0
3
)∗
∗∗
O
b
s.
2
77
78
27
77
8
27
77
8
27
7
78
27
77
8
27
77
8
E
ff
ec
t
si
ze
:
m
ax
to
m
in
ra
n
k
.0
24
.0
06
.0
24
.0
05
A
lg
o
ri
th
m
=
R
a
n
d
om
.0
29
∗∗
.1
4
.1
2
3
.1
7
8
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
m
od
el
2
.
T
h
e
h
ig
h
es
t
ra
n
ke
d
w
o
rk
er
a
n
d
fi
rm
a
re
a
ss
ig
n
ed
a
va
lu
e
o
f
ze
ro
.
L
o
w
er
ra
n
ks
co
rr
es
po
n
d
s
to
h
ig
h
er
n
u
m
be
rs
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
tw
o
-w
a
y
cl
u
st
er
in
g
a
t
th
e
le
ve
l
o
f
th
e
w
o
rk
er
a
n
d
a
t
th
e
le
ve
l
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
.
T
h
e
la
st
ro
w
re
po
rt
s
th
e
p
-v
a
lu
e
o
f
a
n
F
-t
es
t
o
f
th
e
h
yp
o
th
es
is
th
a
t
th
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
th
e
a
lg
o
ri
th
m
ic
a
n
d
th
e
ra
n
d
o
m
su
gg
es
ti
o
n
a
re
th
e
sa
m
e.
34
Table 9: Reservation wages of workers and wages paid by firms
Sample of workers Wage paid by hiring firms
N Reservation Wage Experience No Experience All
High school only 1108 1400 1588 855 973
Vocational training 1563 1500 1900 1017.5 1500
Diploma 242 1900 3250 1168 2900
Degree 665 2500 5685 3500 4500
Notes: This table describes self-reported reservation wages (for job-seekers) and offered wages (from firms),
disaggregating by educational qualification.
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Table 10: Firm recruitment methods
Outcome Estimated ITT Control Mean Observations
Firm performed formal interviews (professionals) 0.0440 0.682 473
(.242)
[.138]
Firm performed formal interviews (non-professionals) -0.0140 0.607 473
(.715)
[.401]
Did any advertising for new hires 0.0580 0.789 473
(.069)*
[.074]*
Did advertising for professional positions 0.120 0.595 473
(.002)***
[.009]***
Did advertising on the job boards 0.0960 0.331 473
(.021)**
[.044]**
Notes: Each row reports a separate regression. For each regression, we report the estimated ITT from parti-
cipating in the job fair, the mean in the control group, and the number of observations. p-values are reported
in parentheses; False Discovery Rate q-values are reported in square brackets.
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Graphs
37
Figure 1: Output of the matching algorithm
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Figure 2: Impacts on Job Search by Fortnight
39
Figure 3: Shape of treatment effects by predicted access to good work
Panel A: Number of trips to search at the job vacancy boards
Panel B: Probability of having permanent job
40
Figure 4: Impacts on Employment Outcomes by Probability of Good Work
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Figure 5: Shape of treatment effects on expectations by predicted access to good
work
Panel A: Reservation wage
Panel B: Expected time to get a job offer
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Online Appendix: Additional
Figures and Tables
A.1
Table A.1: Worker employment ameneties
Outcome Estimated ITT Control Mean Observations
Received job by interview 0.0340 0.167 3786
(.051)*
[.339]
Office work (7d) 0.0190 0.201 3786
(.5)
[1]
Skills match with tasks -0.0150 0.130 3786
(.641)
[1]
Overqualified 0.0140 0.291 3786
(.721)
[1]
Underqualified -0.0210 0.0820 3786
(.326)
[1]
Notes: Each row reports a separate regression. For each regression, we report the estimated ITT from parti-
cipating in the job fair, the mean in the control group, and the number of observations. p-values are reported
in parentheses; False Discovery Rate q-values are reported in square brackets.
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Table A.3: Correlates of worker attendance at the job fairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Background Search Effort Employment All
Degree 0.0639 0.0330
(0.198) (0.209)
Vocational 0.00802 0.00559
(0.0395) (0.0398)
Post secondary 0.000127 -0.0294
(0.191) (0.201)
Female -0.0109 -0.0115
(0.0307) (0.0310)
Migrant 0.0154 -0.00141
(0.0362) (0.0358)
Amhara 0.00957 0.0148
(0.0376) (0.0338)
Oromo -0.0181 -0.0164
(0.0506) (0.0488)
Experience -0.0590 -0.0433
(0.0547) (0.0533)
Age -0.00861 -0.00924*
(0.00528) (0.00518)
Certificate 0.0984*** 0.0654*
(0.0304) (0.0357)
Distance (center) 0.00214 0.00167
(0.00722) (0.00715)
Search 6months 0.0418 0.0155
(0.0409) (0.0469)
Plan Self Empl 0.0399 0.0297
(0.0898) (0.0891)
Search frequency 0.304*** 0.293***
(0.0497) (0.0505)
Wage Empl (6 months) -0.0164 -0.0446
(0.0304) (0.0289)
Work frequency -0.0291 -0.00877
(0.0496) (0.0524)
Employment at the time of the job fair
Permanent Job -0.161** -0.160**
(0.0646) (0.0692)
Any Job -0.00143 -0.00576
(0.0338) (0.0335)
Constant 0.748*** 0.398*** 0.631*** 0.664**
(0.253) (0.0376) (0.0270) (0.263)
Observations 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006
R-squared 0.018 0.045 0.007 0.063
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A.4
Table A.4: Main industry classifications
Main Industry Freq. Percent
Tours-Hospitality 92 18.66
Finanace, Services, Retail 102 20.69
Education, Health, Aid 104 21.1
Manufacturing 126 25.56
Construction, Mining, Farming 69 14
Total 493 100
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Table A.6: Correlates of firm attendance at the job fairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Blocking Others Salaries All
Tours-Hospitality -0.210* -0.742**
(0.117) (0.351)
Finanace, Services, Retail -0.0150 -0.244
(0.119) (0.347)
Education, Health, Aid -0.105 -0.674
(0.130) (0.652)
Manufacturing -0.0556 -0.425
(0.108) (0.301)
bs stad dist 0.00270 0.0352
(0.00385) (0.0231)
Total employees (100s) 0.00171 -0.00377
(0.00586) (0.0203)
Respondent is owner 0.0306 0.0573
(0.0869) (0.251)
Turnover Rate -0.0600 1.343
(0.223) (1.505)
Quit rate -0.0268 0.453
(0.252) (1.799)
Workers with degrees -0.427** -0.772
(0.197) (0.912)
Workers with highschool -0.0534 0.962**
(0.174) (0.456)
Proportion professionals 0.0114 1.611*
(0.228) (0.922)
Proportion female 0.144 0.460
(0.175) (0.397)
Total sales (log) -0.0377 -0.0578
(0.0340) (0.0628)
Hiring Rate 0.248 -0.633
(0.304) (0.595)
Number permanent hires 0.0686 0.166
(0.142) (0.154)
Employee growth rate -1.477 -2.275
(1.347) (1.765)
Growth rate (professionals) 0.120 0.704
(0.437) (0.500)
Growth rate (service) 0.0176 0.289*
(0.137) (0.157)
Growth rate (production) 0.917 1.122
(0.689) (0.947)
Growth rate (support) 0.0536 -0.309
(0.366) (0.414)
Starting salaries (professionals) -0.0517 -0.106
(0.192) (0.260)
Starting salaries (services) 0.279 0.204
(0.184) (0.354)
Starting salaries (production) 0.163 0.254
(0.187) (0.303)
Starting salaries (support) -0.142 -0.181
(0.214) (0.272)
5 year salary (professionals) -0.116 0.0375
(0.207) (0.278)
5 year salary (services) -0.0966 -0.328
(0.224) (0.321)
5 year salary (production) -0.169 -0.228
(0.195) (0.266)
5 year salary (support) 0.0915 0.367
(0.196) (0.284)
Constant 0.834*** 1.051** 1.302 0.835
(0.128) (0.411) (0.987) (1.465)
Observations 232 70 87 61
R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.102 0.576
Ommitted industry dummy is “Construction, Mining”.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.7: Determinants of Attrition
Fairs -0.032** Amhara -0.025
(0.015) (0.017)
search freq -0.051 Oromo -0.014
(0.032) (0.020)
work freq 0.000 Wage empl (6m) 0.008
(0.021) (0.017)
Degree -0.030* Married -0.027
(0.017) (0.019)
Worked (7d) -0.004 Years since school -0.002
(0.019) (0.0030)
Searched job (7d) 0.022 Lives with parents 0.015
(0.020) (0.015)
Female 0.051*** Ever had permanent job 0.017
(0.015) (0.025)
Respondent age 0.003 Searched job (6m) -0.020
(0.0031) (0.020)
Born outside Addis 0.026 Constant 0.037
(0.016) (0.073)
Observations 1,827 R-squared 0.021
F-test (covariates) 1.320 F-test (treatments) 4.780
Prob > F 0.170 Prob > F 0.029
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Figure A.1: Attrition rate from the Phone Survey by Month
Note. Attrition is defined as failure to complete one interview.
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Figure A.2: Impacts on Employment Outcomes by Education
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